INTRODUCTION
This study is concerned with the following economic problem: A single type of item is produced by several (specifically, n) manufacturers who compete for sales in a market wherein the price fluctuates with supply and demand.
The notation of this paper is as follows: xj, 1 < j < n, is the number of items produced by enterprise j during a time interval of interest. To account for the effect of supply and demand, we let f(s) denote the average market price (or inverse demand function) of an item if a total of s items are manufactured over a n time period. Thus s= L xi. It is this variation of commodity market price that causes interaction among producers. It is assumed that producer i must expend kL(x) units of money for the manufacture of x items. Consequently, the profit enjoyed by producer i is given, for any production level xi and total production s, by to have a negative price, we take f(s) = 0 for s> 4. The reader will be able to confirm that the sum of coordinates of an equilibrium point is <? . The technique for demonstrating uniqueness of the equilibrium point suggests an iterative algorithm. The approximation error of this algorithm goes to 0 linearly.
The existence of the equilibrium point of the classical oligopoly game follows from the well-known Nikaido-Isoda theorem (see, e. g., [7] ), which is not constructive.
In [7] , J. B. Rosen gave sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of equilibrium points of concave games but his result does not imply the statements of the theorems of the present paper. is an equilibrium point of the model, and no other point can be an equilibrium point.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The results of this paper were proved by different methods in [8] . The authors have been able to extend the present methods to proving existence and uniqueness, and they have obtained the construction of the equilibrium point to the following partially-cooperative oligopoly model: The manufacturers, whose individual production costs are as in the present paper, gather into disjoint groups and each adjusts his production to maximize the group profit. The result in this partial-cooperation case also had been obtained by a different technique [9] . Univesity of Arizona, U.S.A.
